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Margarito Rodriguez timely appeals following two separate 
counts of Sexual Abuse of Y.R and S.T., after the district court allowed the prosecutor 
to proffer unsworn testimony at trial that was inconsistent with the witness' direct 
examination testimony. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Rodriguez's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference. 
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right to a 
2. Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to testify without allowing 
Mr. Rodriguez to cross examine her thereby violating Mr. Rodriguez's rights 
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
3. Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to engage in misconduct 
by offering facts not in evidence by allowing the detective to give his opinion 
about what he saw on the video, State's Exhibit #19, to the jury? 
4. Did the district court err when it improperly commented on the evidence by 
admonishing the jury to only consider the video and the narrative for the charge 
against Mr. Rodriguez involving S.T., thereby violating Mr. Rodriguez's right to a 




The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify During Direct 
Examination In Violation Of Mr. Rodriguez's Right To Due Process And Right To A Fair 
Trial 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to testify, resulting in 
inadmissible, unsworn testimony presented to a jury. This violated Mr. Rodriguez's 
rights to due process and a fair trial. 
B. The District Court's Error Violated Mr. Rodriguez's Due Process And Right To A 
Fair Trial Which Resulted In Fundamental Error 
Mr. Rodriguez incorporates his argument in Section I of his Appellant's Brief and 
will not repeat those arguments here (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-16), but will directly 
address the claims made in the State's Response regarding the unsworn testimony of 
the prosecutor. The State alleges that admission of Ms. Kallin's question to S.T. does 
not rise to the level of fundamental error because it didn't violate Mr. Rodriguez's 
constitutional rights. (Respondent's Brief. pp.5-14.) In doing so, the State tries to 
eliminate the prejudicial effect of Ms. Kallin's question by rephrasing it as "Do you 
remember us talking about that?" (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) Further, it defines 
Ms. Kallin's inadmissible testimony "And do you remember when you were talking to 
me, I asked you about any time that you had seen your father masturbate and you 
indicated you remembered one time ... ," as setting "forth the factual premise of the 
question." (Id. at 7.) Regardless of the form in which the information was conveyed to 
the jury, "a prosecutor must 'guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of 
3 
tend to them from considering only the evidence introduced."' 
V. 1 715 (quoting V. 9 
(1903)). The of Ms. Kallin's testimony prejudiced the and 
hindered them from considering only the evidence introduced. 
C. Ms. Kallin's Unsworn Testimony Violated Rule 3.7 Of The Idaho Rule Of 
Professional Conduct (1.R.C.P.) Which Prohibits Attorneys From Testifying In A 
Case In Which The Attorney Is Involved 
The State argues Mr. Rodriguez's reliance on I.R.C.P 3.7 is misplaced. First, it 
argues because the rule has no constitutional significance, it is irrelevant. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) This argument does not take into account the basis for 
I R.C.P 3.7, which is grounded in constitutional protections. The commentary to 
I R.P.C. 3.7 states "the tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be 
confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness." This safeguard 
ensures there is no blurring of the line between the role of attorney and witness in the 
eyes of the jury. The commentary further delineates between witness and advocate, 
stating "[a] witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an 
advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others." Further, 
the rule assumes that without such a rule, "it may not be clear whether a statement by 
an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof." Here, the 
prosecutor's unsworn testimony was based on her own personal knowledge, i.e., a 
conversation she had with S.T. She was not acting as an advocate when she explained 
and commented on S.T.'s testimony, that she never saw her father masturbate. 
Contrary to the State's claim, this distinction is relevant because Mr. Rodriguez's due 
4 
his right to a fair and impartial jury were violated when the prosecutor 
unsworn subject cross the 
ignores State v. 135 894 App. 
2001 ). The issue in Aguilar was whether the prosecutor's inducement of a witness to 
participate in a sting operation in exchange for a reduction of pending charges, made 
the prosecuting attorney a necessary witness for the defense. The defendant alleged 
the prosecutor violated of I.R.C.P 3.7 by testifying in a case where the prosecutor 
represented one of the parties. The defendant challenged the district court's 
determination that the prosecuting attorney not be disqualified from representing the 
State in its prosecution of him. Id. at 895. The Court of Appeals acknowledged no Idaho 
appellate court has directly addressed the circumstances under which a defendant 
should be allowed to call the prosecuting attorney as a witness. Id. The Aguilar Court 
analyzed United States v. Prantil, 764 F .2d 548 (91h Cir. 1985), in which the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's 
motion for substitution of an alternative prosecutor, where the prosecutor was a 
testifying witness in the trial. Aguilar, 135 Idaho at 896. Aguilar acknowledged that the 
Prantil Court, in coming to that conclusion, determined that the prosecuting attorney 
was a witness to and a participant in, some aspect of all of the events alleged in the 
indictment. Aguilar, 135 Idaho at 896. Aguilar, however, found Prantil distinguishable. In 
so concluding, the Court determined that the prosecuting attorney was not a participant 
in or a witness to the acts or transaction upon which the defendant's prosecution was 
based. Id. Moreover, the Court of Appeals determined that the defendant had not shown 
a "compelling need" to call the prosecutor as a witness. Id. Unlike Aguilar, the 
5 
prosecuting attorney here witnessed a statement which was material to the event 
in indictment, 
Rodriguez masturbate. 




has shown a compelling need call 
The State argues even if the prosecutor's question was improper, the defendant 
engaged in the same tactic when cross-examining S.T. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11 .) 
The State alleges that while cross examining S.T., the defendant asked her whether she 
remembered telling Mrs. Perry, who was with the Nampa Family Justice Center, that 
S.T. never saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. Id. The State misstates Mr. Rodriguez's 
argument. Mr. Rodriguez's question was consistent with the testimony of S.T.; 
Ms. Kallin's testimony was inconsistent with S.T.'s testimony. Mr. Rodriguez's concern 
in this case is not the proposal of factual scenarios, but rather the proposal of factual 
scenarios inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. 
Another reason the State argues I.R.C.P. 3.7 is inapplicable is "because the 
prosecutor was not 'likely to be a necessary witness."' (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) The 
State cites I.R.E. 613(b) as support, stating "prior statements may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence." Id. I.R.E. 613(b) provides "extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to 
explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to 
interrogate the witness thereon ... "Although it is not clear from their brief, this argument 
actually favors Mr. Rodriguez. The extrinsic evidence in this case is Ms. Kallin's 
testimony that S.T. said she saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. S.T. denied she said this. 
6 
under the State's reading of 613(b), the testimony from Ms. Kallin 
it was extrinsic 
lastly, State argues that Rodriguez's I.RC. 7 argument is 
inapplicable because the Supreme Court of the United States specifically rejected this 
sort of analysis in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U S. 209 (1982). 2 (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) In 
Smith, the appellant argued that the prosecutor withheld the fact that a juror applied to 
be an investigator in the prosecutor's office. Smith 455 U S. at 209. The court found no 
harm to the defendant because the analysis for prosecutorial misconduct is fairness of 
the trial, not conduct of the prosecutor. Id at 219. In contrast, Mr. Rodriguez alleges 
prosecutorial misconduct, which impacted the fairness of his trial, not the conduct of the 
prosecutor. For instance, in Issue I, Mr. Rodriguez alleges his right to due process and 
right to a fair trial before an impartial jury and his right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitutions were violated. 
None of these issues focus on the "culpability of the prosecutor", but focus on how the 
prosecutor's misconduct resulted in various violations of Mr. Rodriguez's constitutional 
rights. 
1 I.R.E. 613 (b) would bar Ms. Kallin from testifying what S.T. told her in an interview. 
S.T. denied she made the statement. However, Mr. Rodriguez was never given the 
opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Kallin regarding this statement. Mr. Rodriguez asserts 
this error violated his due process rights under the United States Constitution. 
2 The State cites Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 940, 219 (1982). Mr. Rodriguez assumes 
this was a typographical error and intended to cite it as Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 
(1982). 
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The District Court Erred When It Failed To Give The Jury Any Limiting 
Instructions To Ensure The Unsworn Testimony Was Not Used For An Improper 
State claims "Mr. Rodriguez cherry-picked the present a 
misleading argument." (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) In support of this conclusion, the 
State minimizes the effect of and actually ignores any prejudice the instructions had on 
Mr. Rodriguez's ability to have a fair trial. Mr. Rodriguez, in his Appellant's Brief, fleshed 
out the way in which Ms. Kallin's misconduct effected the trial. First, the court told the 
jury that opening statements are not in evidence. (Tr., p.168, L.25 - p.169, L.1.) 
Second, immediately prior to opening statements, the Court told the jury "you must 
decide the case only on the evidence received in court." (Tr., p.179, Ls.15-17.) In 
opening statements, Ms. Voss told the jury "you will also hear from the defendant's 
other daughter, [S.T.] She's 14 today. [S.T.] will talk to you about seeing her father 
masturbate in front of her." (Tr., p.181, Ls.4-7.) 
The State acknowledges that the district court instructed the jury that it was to 
base its verdict on the evidence, and that the statements of the lawyers were not in 
evidence. (Tr., p.349, L.13 - p.350, L.5 ) However, the State ignores the fact when the 
district court gave that instruction to the jury, it was after all of the evidence was 
presented. That instruction was given after the State told the jury "S.T. will talk to you 
about seeing her father masturbate in front of her." (Tr., 181, Ls.4-7.) That instruction 
was given after S.T. denied seeing her father masturbate. That instruction was given 
after Ms. Kallin told the jury that S.T. said she saw her father masturbate. The State, in 
an attempt to show Mr. Rodriguez failed to show prejudice, argues "it did not ultimately 
rise to the level of denying Mr. Rodriguez's due process right to a fair trial." 
8 
Brief, p.12.) Based upon conclusion, the State claims it stand 
Jury unsworn Ms. m 
however, is case. 
During deliberations, the jury returned with two questions, only one of which is 
relevant here. (Tr., p.371, L.6 p.380, L 11.) Jurors asked, "Instruction 32: Is inducing, 
causing or permitting opportunity, To witness an act of sexual conduct, sufficient cause 
to establish guilt on point 3? That is to say, if we conclude the victim did not actually 
see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for finding of guilt?" (R., p.230 (emphasis in 
original).) The Court, with agreement of the parties, told the jury to answer the question 
by reading the instruction. (Tr., p.381, L.4 - p.382, L.5.) Instruction 32 deals specifically 
with the allegation of Sexual Abuse of a Child, S.T. The portion of the instruction the 
jury had a question about states: "3. the defendant Margarito Rodriguez induced, 
caused or permitted S.T. (D.O.B: 5/23/2000) to witness an act of sexual conduct." 
(R., p.217.) The State correctly acknowledged that to show error Mr. Rodriguez "would 
have to show that the jury ignored its instructions, considered the question as evidence, 
and rendered a different verdict than it would have based on other evidence, which 
included a video of the act in question."3 (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) The State argues 
Mr. Rodriguez failed to make this showing 
S.T. testified she never saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. This testimony, if 
believed, would require the jury to acquit Mr. Rodriguez of the charge involving S.T. The 
3 Mr. Rodriguez incorporates here his Appellant Brief argument regarding the video. 
Mr. Rodriguez will also address select issues raised by the State, regarding the video 
later in this brief. 
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the jury considered the prosecutor's unsworn testimony in 
Cross-Examining S.T. Does Not Cure The Violation Of Mr. Rodriguez's Due 
Process Rights. As S.T. Is Not The Witness Who Made The Statement 
The State, in an effort to prove Mr. Rodriguez has failed to prove prejudice, 
argues that Mr. Rodriguez had ample opportunity to cross-examine S.T. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.12.) This argument does not address how the admission of Ms. Kallin's 
testimony prejudiced Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez's due process rights were violated 
when Ms. Kallin provided unsworn testimony, not subject to cross-examination. It is 
illogical for defense counsel to cross-examine S.T., as S.T. testified she never saw 
Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. Mr. Rodriguez's rights were violated when he was unable to 
cross examine Ms. Kallin, not S.T. 
The State diminishes the effect the jury's question had on Mr. Rodriguez's due 
process rights. Specifically, the State sees no difference between the jury question 
"whether inducing, causing or permitting opportunity to witness" and the jury instruction 
which required that Mr. Rodriguez "induced, caused or permitted S.T. to witness an act 
of sexual conduct" (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.) Absent from the State's analysis is 
the presence of the word "opportunity" The state's argument is that "nothing in the 
question or answer indicated that the jury improperly considered the prosecutor's 
question to be evidence." (Id. at 14). This is not consistent with the evidence in the 
case. The only admissible testimony regarding this issue is from S.T., who said she 
never saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. Therefore, if the jury relied on the admissible 
testimony only, they would have returned a not guilty verdict on this count. The 
10 
unsworn testimony, coupled with the court's improper instructions, is the 
could jury, 
he induced, caused or permitted S.T. 
question, 
witness an of 
sexual conduct, but believed he only permitted the opportunity. Mr. Rodriguez's 
conviction was based on consideration of evidence other than S.T.'s testimony, 
specifically Ms. Kallin's testimony, as hers was the only testimony that S.T. told saw 
Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. 
11. 
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify In Violation Of 
Mr. Rodriguez's Rights Under The Confrontation Clause Of The Sixth Amendment To 
The United States Constitution 
Mr. Rodriguez incorporates his argument in Section II of the Appellant's Brief 
here but Mr. Rodriguez will address directly the claims made in the State's response 
regarding Mr. Rodriguez's right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. The State argues that the prosecutor's question was 
not an out-of-court testimonial statement, but rather an in-court question by counsel 
regarding an out-of-court statement by a witness on the stand. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.9-10.) This is simply not the case. S denied telling Ms. Kallin she saw her father 
masturbate. (Tr., p.230, L.25 - p.231, L.4.) Therefore, the statement that S.T. said she 
saw her father masturbate is attributed to Ms. Kallin, not S.T. Mr. Rodriguez's due 
process rights were violated because he didn't have an opportunity to cross examine 
Ms. Kallin. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Most importantly, the district court erred when it 
allowed Ms. Kallin to testify without being subject to cross-examination. Placing 
Ms. Kallin under oath, subject to cross examination, would have been the only way to 
11 
cure prejud once the court allowed testify. Allowing Ms. Kallin to testify 
violated constitutional error 
on Mr. Rodriguez was prejudiced as a result 
II L 
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Engage In Misconduct By 
Offering Facts Not In Evidence By Allowing The Detective To Give His Opinion About 
What He Saw On State's Exhibit 19, A Video4 , To The Jury 
Mr. Rodriguez incorporates his argument in Section Ill of his Appellant's Brief, 
but will address the claims made in the State's response, that the error did not rise to 
the level of fundamental error by relieving the State of proving its burden of whether 
Mr. Rodriguez was masturbating in front of S.T. (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) The State 
alleges Mr. Rodriguez has failed to show fundamental error in the limiting instruction 
and testimony regarding Exhibit 19. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-19), and claims that 
Mr. Rodriguez's argument is specious. (Respondent's Brief, p.18.) To the contrary, 
considering only the admissible evidence would warrant an acquittal on this charge The 
only way for the jury to find Mr. Rodriguez guilty was for it to consider evidence that was 
improperly admitted, specifically the detective's opinion about what he believed was on 
State's Exhibit 19, a video. S.T.'s testimony did not support the detective's narrative. 
Therefore, two of the most important factual determinations for the jury, whether the 
man in the video masturbated, and whether it was done in front of S.T., came from 
Ms. Kallin's unsworn testimony, which was affirmed by the detective's testimony stating 
4 The State alleges that Exhibit 19 is not in the record on appeal and must be presumed 
to support the verdict. (Respondent's Brief, p.13 n.6.) Exhibit 19 was retained by 
Canyon County District Court as required by I.C.R. 16(m)(1) but it was included in the 
Certificate of Exhibits. (R., p.278.) 
12 
opinion about the contents of the video. The only admissible evidence, S 's 
in an acquittal. this proving a 
resulting in fundamental error. 
IV. 
The District Court Erred When It Made Improper Comments On The Evidence By 
Admonishing The Jury To Only Consider The Video (State's Exhibit 19) And The 
Detective's Narrative For The Charge Against Mr. Rodriguez Involving S.T., Thereby 
Violating Mr. Rodriguez's Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury 
The state oversimplifies and mischaracterizes Mr. Rodriguez's argument. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19.) In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Rodriguez argues the 
district court made improper comments on the evidence when it admonished the jury to 
only consider the video and the narrative for the charge involving S.T., and these 
improper comments violated his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. (Appellant 
Brief, pp.26-29.) The State mischaracterizes Mr. Rodriguez's argument as being "that 
the district court committed fundamental error by giving the instruction limiting the jury's 
consideration to the admissible components of Exhibit 1 " (Respondent's Brief, pp.18-
19.) The State's reframing of this argument is incorrect. Mr. Rodriguez maintains the 
district court erred when it allowed Detective Bryant to give his opinion, that the male in 
the video, State's Exhibit 19, was masturbating, which was an offer of facts not in 
evidence. By extension, Mr. Rodriguez maintains the district court also erred when it 
instructed the jury it could only consider the video and narrative for the charge involving 
S.T, because the court offered facts not in evidence. One argument focuses on 
Detective Bryant's narrative, while the other focuses on the court's improper comment 
on the evidence. The court's improper comment on the evidence relieved the State of its 
13 
of proving the person in the video was Mr. Rodriguez, that the other person in 
was 
someone else, was the jury, not 
it was Mr. Rodriguez or. not 
Unlike the 
constitutional right was even implicated ... " (Respondent's Brief, p.19.), this error 
violated Mr. Rodriguez's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. Because the court 
offered an improper comment on the evidence, Mr. Rodriguez was not given a fair trial 
before an impartial jury. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above and in the Appellant's Brief, this Court should 
vacate Mr. Rodriguez's conviction relating to S.T. and remand to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 2015. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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